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DO JUDGES THINK? COMMENTS ON 
SEVERAL PAPERS PRESENTED AT THE  
DUKE LAW JOURNAL’S CONFERENCE ON 
MEASURING JUDGES AND JUSTICE 
ROBERT HENRY† 
I accepted an invitation to speak on this Symposium’s panel 
addressing Professor Ramseyer’s article on the political preferences 
of the Japanese Supreme Court—despite the danger of citation to 
foreign law.1 But I have also been invited to comment on all of the 
Symposium’s articles, and generally on the so-called legal and 
attitudinal models that seek to better explain or evaluate judicial 
opinions. These models do not address, as a rule, other judicial 
responsibilities, judicial virtues (if they exist), or even justice itself (if 
it too exists, as some of us hopeless romantics think). At the outset, I 
should mention that most of my comments relate to the federal 
appellate judiciary, from whence I hail. 
Over one hundred years ago, Finley Peter Dunne’s fabled Irish 
immigrant sage Mr. Dooley explained to his friend Mr. Hennesy, over 
a pint in a South-Side Chicago pub, how the cow ate the cabbage.2 In 
explaining the “reasoning” behind the Supreme Court’s decision in 
the Insular Cases of 1901 (which essentially held that, after the 
Spanish-American War, certain protections of the Constitution did 
not extend to new U.S. subjects in Hawaii, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, 
and the Philippines), Mr. Dooley expressed some frustration before 
announcing the dispositive rule. He wondered aloud to Hennesy, in 
the words popularly describing the issue, whether the Constitution 
followed the flag3—that is, after the Stars and Stripes heralded the 
military victories that gained much of the Spanish empire, whether 
 
Copyright © 2009 by Robert Henry. 
 † Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. 
 1. J. Mark Ramseyer, Predicting Court Outcomes Through Political Preferences: The 
Japanese Supreme Court and the Chaos of 1993, 58 DUKE L.J. 1557 (2009). 
 2. See FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY’S OPINIONS 21–26 (1901). 
 3. Id. at 21–22. 
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the noble Constitution applied to new areas under American control. 
The fourteen decisions that make up the Insular Cases covered 
several issues, from whether duties applied to sugar imported from 
Puerto Rico4 to the application of the Bill of Rights to new 
acquisitions.5 All in all, the cases could be thought of as deciding 
whether and how United States imperialism was legally possible. 
After a very amusing discussion of the Court and the various 
Justices, Mr. Dooley finally announced his theory of the ratio 
decidendi of the case, suggesting that the massive defeat of William 
Jennings Bryan by William McKinley might have had something to 
do with it: “That is,” said Mr. Dooley, “no matther whether th’ 
constitution follows th’ flag or not, th’ supreme coort follows th’ 
iliction returns.”6 
I suppose that this conference is here, over one hundred years 
later, to put some meat on the bones of the Dooley dictum. Are 
judges political? Well, those that run for office, particularly after 
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,7 are certainly political.8 And 
if, in Professor David Easton’s classic phrase, politics is the 
authoritative allocation of values,9 then surely judges are political 
actors. But what about those who are appointed, or what about the 
judicial enterprise itself? Are they meaningfully constrained by the 
law, or common purposes, or professional techniques and values? 
Current scholarship, including Judge Posner’s fascinating book 
How Judges Think, makes it clear that election returns—politics—
play a role (as well as ideology, life experiences, emotion, personality, 
collegiality; and maybe religion, strategy, illness, and a bad hair day).10 
And of course, he is not just talking about elections in which judges 
have to run for office. 
 
 4. De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 2 (1901). 
 5. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 218 (1903). 
 6. DUNNE, supra note 2, at 26. 
 7. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
 8. And unlike life-tenured judges, those judges may very well fit within some models of 
public choice theory used to explain the actions of those that run for office. One example is the 
idea that only two kinds of politicians exist, maximizers and maintainers. The omnipresent goal 
is to get reelected, and some politicians cater every action to maximize that result. Others are 
willing to push the envelope a bit, voting for ideology or even religion or morality, but not so 
much so that they cannot maintain political office. For an excellent description of this theory, 
see MORRIS P. FIORINA, REPRESENTATIVES, ROLL CALLS, AND CONSTITUENCIES 29–40 
(1974). 
 9. DAVID EASTON, A FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL ANALYSIS 50 (1965). 
 10. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008). 
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 What some scholars—not Judge Posner—seem to forget is that 
law, lawyers, litigants, precedent, statutes, constitutions, treaties, 
other legal materials11 (sometimes legal scholarship!), and even craft 
and imagination play extensive roles too. Judge Posner, noting that 
American judges’ considerable freedom from internal and external 
constraints does not suggest that judging is random, willful, or 
political in a partisan sense, makes an important point: 
Most judges, like most serious artists, are trying to do a “good job,” 
with what is “good” being defined by the standards for the “art” in 
question. The judicial art prominently includes the legalist factors, 
and so those factors figure prominently in judicial decisions–and 
rightly so. But innovative judges challenge the accepted standards of 
their art, just as innovative artists challenge the accepted standards 
of their arts. As there are no fixed, incontestable criteria of artistic 
excellence, so there are no fixed, incontestable criteria of judicial 
excellence. And in law as in art, the innovators have the greater 
influence on the evolution of their field.12 
Implicit in this scholarship, is, of course, another question: Do judges 
think? As Judge Posner points out, if pure legalism or formalism, or 
textualism or originalism, fully explained the phenomena of judging, 
then judges “would be well on the road to being superseded by 
digitized artificial intelligence programs.”13 He wonders aloud (well, 
in a footnote) “why originalists and other legalists are not AI 
[artificial intelligence] enthusiasts.”14 This is an interesting point—I 
vote for the Oxford English Dictionary as the word model, which 
would at least allow for a little literary flare from time to time. 
Alternatively speaking, if judges are purely political, they also 
would not need to think. They could simply mirror the party 
platform, or comply with their appointers’ wishes, or read a good 
opinion poll and do likewise. (But, of course, judges cannot appear to 
have done only this; they still have to make their decisionmaking 
process looked reasoned, and therefore marketable.)15 
 
 11. Indeed, the vast majority of cases are decided by these materials, especially in courts 
other than the Supreme Court of the United States. It is only cases in the “open areas,” as Judge 
Posner describes controversial cases, “in which a judge is a legislator.” Id. at 15. 
 12. Id. at 12–13. 
 13. Id. at 5. 
 14. Id. at 5 n.10. 
 15. Kelly A. MacGrady & John W. Van Doren, AALS Constitutional Law Panel on 
Brown, Another Council of Nicaea?, 35 AKRON L. REV. 371, 423 (2002) (“[T]he Supreme Court 
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Despite the fact that there are no incontestable criteria of judicial 
excellence, economics scholars seek to find some common ground. 
Studies seek to predict judicial outcomes by analysis of judicial inputs, 
such as party identification of appointers and the ideology that judges 
carry with them. They also seek to evaluate judges by various criteria: 
productivity, citation, and independence being a primary model. This 
process has engendered considerable controversy. Political scientists 
accuse the legal academy of abdicating its duty to write in this area; 
legal academicians counter that the political science community does 
not adequately understand sophistications necessary to evaluate legal 
models; and scholars of both camps have crossed pens with judges 
who find these studies reductionist, incomplete, and possibly 
worrisome, especially if the studies are designed to influence 
production as well as to accomplish prediction. 
It is also a bit unclear why scholars conduct these studies: Do 
they intend their studies to be descriptive and predictive, or do they 
have normative goals? I suppose most scholars seek to describe and 
explain what is happening, yet why do this without an outcome in 
mind? Perhaps these studies result simply from what philosopher 
Lionell Rubinoff terms “the law of the possible”: “What it is possible 
for science to know science must know. What it is possible for 
technology to do technology is obliged to do. Whatever is possible is 
obligatory.”16 Scholars have the tools to study these phenomena, and 
therefore they must do so. Yet given the scarcity of scholarly time, 
and perhaps the need to have scholars address more helpful things (as 
Judge Harry Edwards has rather notoriously noted),17 does it make 
sense to study for the sake of studying? Will this confuse knowledge 
with virtue? 
But some scholars suggest a crisis exists that needs to be 
addressed: that the Supreme Court appointment process is broken, 
that it produces “mediocre” judges (Roman Hruska’s famed 
 
could not just send out a decree and expect everyone to salute. The legal process require[s] a 
process of reasoned elaboration.”). 
 16. Lionel Rubinoff, Technology and the Crisis of Rationality: Reflections on the Death and 
Rebirth of Dialogue, 15 PHIL. F. 261, 278 (1977). 
 17. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the 
Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 54 (1992) (“As a practitioner, I benefit very little from 
academic literature. This is perhaps the greatest disparity between ‘what goes on’ at most law 
schools . . . and the actual practice of law. The greatest problem is that most of the academic 
literature does not address the problems that arise in my practice. I am not sure that most law 
professors have much of a sense of (or care) what those legal issues are.”). 
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comment comes to mind18), that the system is a “mess”19 and needs to 
be “fixed.”20 The idea seems to be that these evaluations and studies 
(mostly of sitting federal appellate judges, from whose ranks most 
recent appointees have come) will help that process.21 Yet it is unclear 
that the process wants help, or will need or use it. President Obama is 
a talented lawyer and may have his own ideas about how to select a 
Justice, which may include going outside the box of my brothers and 
sisters. Remember Hugo Black? Presidents sometimes grant the 
ermine in appreciation for a life’s work, for friendship and political 
loyalty, or perhaps even for political strategy. Will the models factor 
in these considerations? 
Further, some scholars argue that the Supreme Court 
appointment process is working just fine, although they damn it with 
faint praise. For example, Professors Cross and Lindquist conclude 
that today’s confirmation process “precludes the selection of ‘great’ 
Justices and is biased in favor of ‘competent, noncontroversial jurists 
with a restrained understanding of the role of the federal judiciary.’”22 
First do no harm, less can be more. Other scholars conclude that Mr. 
Dooley was not only descriptively correct but also normatively 
correct: Presidents appoint judges based largely on ideological 
compatibility, most judges are confirmed, and thus the Court is 
politically representative in a broad way, with some lag. The Court 
does follow election returns, and why worry about that in a nation 
largely based on democratic principles?23 
 
 18. See William H. Honan, Roman L. Hruska Dies at 94; Leading Senate Conservative, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1999, at B8 (“‘Even if he were mediocre,’ Mr. Hruska declared, ‘there are 
a lot of mediocre judges and people and lawyers. They are entitled to a little representation, 
aren’t they, and a little chance? We can’t have all Brandeises, Frankfurters and Cardozos.’” 
(quoting U.S. Sen. Roman L. Hruska)). 
 19. See, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE 
FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (1995). 
 20. See generally CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, THE NEXT JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE 
SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 4 (2007) (“Americans need a better way to talk 
about Supreme Court appointments, and they need it now . . . .”). 
 21. Frank B. Cross & Stefanie Lindquist, Judging the Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1383, 1396–400 
(2009). 
 22. Id. at 1397. 
 23. See, e.g., TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT (2d ed. 2001); 
see also The ABA Plots a Judicial Coup, WALL STREET J., Aug. 14, 2008, at A12 (“A better 
option is to keep the judicial nominating process democratically accountable and transparent. 
Those who don’t like the judges a President appoints can take their preferences out at the ballot 
box.”). 
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If the studies are meant to evaluate sitting judges, other 
problems emerge. First, in a sense of sporting fairness, we might want 
to tell the judges what the criteria are before cumulating them. 
Second, related to the study cited above, are the processes really 
broken? Federal appellate courts get relatively high marks, and 
anecdotally I will tell you that every one of my colleagues on the 
Tenth Circuit is remarkably bright and industrious. Perhaps most 
amazingly, all of us get along rather well. The selection process may 
be more detailed and effective than the academy understands. It 
includes a thorough review of the work an applicant has done; 
extensive evaluations by professional peers through a detailed process 
conducted by the American Bar Association (ABA);24 and 
background checks by the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), 
White House Counsel, the Department of Justice, and counsel to 
both parties in the Senate Judiciary Committee. Interestingly, the 
studies I have read spend little time considering the ABA process, the 
evaluations in the Almanac of the Judiciary, and the executive and 
legislative investigations. 
With respect to elected or retained judges, it is unclear whether 
the electorate would be informed by scholarly information, especially 
given the way it is written—for scholars. The media could summarize 
the studies, and interest groups who like them could utilize them to 
inform the electorate, but again it is unclear how useful they would 
be. Twenty-second sound bites seem to dominate the hustings, and 
the relevance of the studies may depend upon the skill of a 
candidate’s public relations consultants and the amount of the 
campaign budget. 
I hesitate to enter this fray for several reasons. First, when the 
status quo is acceptable, judicial anonymity is almost always a good 
idea. As President Coolidge famously said, “I have never been hurt 
by anything I didn’t say.”25 I hope that this does not make me a 
leisure-seeking, unadventurous judicial minimalist. Second, my 
inability to deal with things mathematical was, as it is for many 
lawyers and judges, a strong reason why I left the study of political 
science for law school. I do not deal very much with the economic and 
social science techniques used in many of these studies, and when I 
 
 24. Although the ABA has its critics, see The ABA Plots a Judicial Coup, supra note 23, a 
group of lawyers is probably best positioned to evaluate the issue of temperament—whether 
that is the ABA or some other group. 
 25. ROBERT SOBEL, COOLIDGE: AN AMERICAN ENIGMA 138 (2000). 
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must do so in a case, I have a bit more time to focus on a particular 
sample or technique. 
Third, I am a bit unsure of the whole enterprise—believing, like 
my old friend Professor Don Songer, that precedent still plays a key 
role in decisions that appellate judges make.26 And perhaps a number 
of other factors play a role, too: the language of the text (“[we] are all 
originalists now, Dworkin says,”27 although his originalism is 
unorthodox, or maybe neo-orthodox), canons and counter-canons, 
possibly collegiality, fairness and justice, and—as a study I recently 
glanced at suggested—maybe even law clerks. 
Something I always liked about my esteemed friend Sandra Day 
O’Connor when she was sitting with the Supremes was that one was 
never quite sure where she would come out in a close case. This made 
one think that perhaps she was looking at the facts at hand to resolve 
the case narrowly (what a concept!)—that her decision did not reflect 
the GOP line, textualism, originalism, purposivism, civic 
republicanism, restrained pragmatism, pragmatic restraint, or even 
the spicy posole that was last night’s dinner. Close cases with her were 
interesting, and quite often not easily predictable—especially in the 
details. Perhaps ideological shift, judicial cosmopolitanism, 
innovation, or craft can explain Justice O’Connor’s decisionmaking—
whatever it was, it was interesting. 
The late Judge Richard Arnold, one of the most admired federal 
judges in the United States, told the story of his nomination to the 
federal district court in a Goldberg Lecture at Southern Methodist 
University. His story speaks partially to this Symposium’s topic in 
that it shows that literal judicial inputs are certainly political. After 
explaining that Senator Bumpers instructed him to write his own 
letter of nomination to the president, a request with which he eagerly 
and eloquently complied, he continued the story: 
A few days later, I got a call to appear at the Department of Justice 
to be interrogated, and I thought they would ask me what my 
judicial philosophy was. I didn’t have one. I don’t think I have one 
now. But I was most relived when only two questions were put to 
 
 26. See Susan B. Haire, Stefanie A. Lindquist & Donald R. Songer, Appellate Court 
Supervision in the Federal Judiciary: A Hierarchical Perspective, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 143, 147 
(2003). 
 27. See Lawrence H. Tribe, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW 65, 67 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
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me: “Was I breathing?” and “Did I come from [Senator 
Bumpers]?”28 
I think it is interesting that Judge Arnold believed that he had no 
judicial philosophy; and having known Judge Arnold a bit, I believe 
him. He did not fit a particular mold. I realize that judicial philosophy 
is different from ideology—I suppose that, like the mythical daimon, 
everyone has some sort of attendant spirit of ideology. (I, for one, am 
a liberal Baptist evolutionist.) But Judge Arnold was almost 
universally acclaimed as a jurist and highly regarded in Congress. 
Even the academy seemed to think he was worth knowing. My point 
is that he thought that a number of things comprised the art of 
judging, including the belief that everything judges do should be 
formally published and citable.29 (I wonder how that would work in 
the academy). Judge Arnold thought that efficiency was a goal, but 
also that, within certain parameters, compromise, collegiality, craft—
even fairness and justice—might be relevant. Different things counted 
in different ways at different times and under different circumstances. 
I suppose he was a restrained legal pragmatist, though perhaps a bit 
less restrained than Judge Posner—although Judge Posner seems to 
be able, often brilliantly, to write his way out of anything. But again, 
predicting the voting pattern of an individual like Judge Arnold may 
require some very advanced paradigms. 
My example of Judge Arnold may not be worth much, 
economically speaking. As Judge Posner noted in a fascinating article 
in 1993: 
By treating judges and Justices as ordinary people, my approach 
makes them fit subjects for economic analysis; for economists have 
no theories of genius. It is fortunate for economic analysis, 
therefore, that most law is made not by the tiny handful of great 
judges but by the great mass of ordinary ones . . . . Because there are 
so many ordinary judges, and because anti-intellectualism runs deep 
in the American soul, there is even a cult of ordinariness in judging. 
Exceptionally able judges arouse suspicion of having an “agenda,” 
 
 28. Richard S. Arnold, Irving L. Goldberg Lecture, Southern Methodist University Dedman 
School of Law: The Federal Courts: Causes of Discontent, 56 SMU L. REV. 767, 767 (2003). 
 29. See, e.g., Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899, vacated on reh’g en banc, 235 
F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000). 
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that is, of wanting to be something more than just corks bobbing on 
the waves of litigation or umpires calling balls and strikes.30 
So it may be simply that Judge Arnold was an extraordinary judge; 
that he was less predictable, not a bobbing cork or a mechanistic 
umpire; or that he was a thinking judge, and maybe even a noble one, 
less desirous of his own self-maximization, hardworking and 
conscientious. 
Professor Ramseyer, the Mitsubishi Professor of Japanese Legal 
Studies at Harvard, has offered an answer. In his article, he joins most 
of this Issue’s articles in concluding that empirical studies successfully 
explain some court decisions through the party identification of 
judicial appointers.31 He suggests that others—nonempirical students, 
and some judges—find these studies offensive, partly because they 
miss the point: Judges are predictable only because they are 
independent,32 and to the extent judicial independence is a good thing 
(and, say, the Bangalore Principles33 suggest that a great many 
countries think it is), the fact that judges are political should engender 
pride. Of course, pride cometh before the fall, and I am not sure the 
Professor’s economical colleagues share his pride–if he is proud, of 
which I am also unsure (in an earlier draft he stated: “To the extent 
judicial independence is a good, it should engender pride.”34) It would 
help if I could confer with a couple of colleagues on this and take an 
initial vote. Although some of the articles suggest that judicial 
independence is in fact a very good thing, especially from the 
perspective of economics, one would hope that scholars might spend 
some more time on the virtues of judicial independence.35 
 
 30. Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing 
Everybody Else Does), 3 SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 1, 4 (1993) (footnotes omitted). 
 31. Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 1558. 
 32. Id. at 1558–59. 
 33. BANGLORE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2002), available at 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/corruption/judicial_group/Bangalore_principles.pdf. Brazil, the 
Czech Republic, Egypt, France, Mexico, Mozambique, the Netherlands, Norway, the 
Philippines, Madagascar, Hungary, Germany, Sierra Leone, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States participated in the rule-making process. Id. at 10–11. 
 34. J. Mark Ramseyer, Predicting Court Outcomes Through Political Preferences: The 
Japanese Supreme Court and the Chaos of 1993, at 3 (Harv. John M. Olin Ctr. for L., Econ., & 
Bus., Discussion Paper No. 624, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1326548.  
 35. Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Judicial Evaluations and Information 
Forcing: Ranking State High Courts and Their Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1313, 1323–25 (2009). 
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I would like to briefly discuss these issues, first exploring why 
there may be some offense taken and some offense given.36 Beyond 
some unfortunate rhetoric on both sides, I think judges are skeptical 
of the models scholars have offered because we do not think they are 
accurate; we are not sure of their relevance; and we think that 
whether they are descriptive or predictive, they still may not be 
helpful. 
I.  TAKING OFFENSE 
This important conference at Duke University School of Law is a 
relatively unique one. There have been few conferences where judges 
(especially judges who are not empirical scholars) and scholars have 
convened to discuss these issues. Professor Ramseyer, as noted, finds 
that some take offense at empirical studies, and he is correct, but he 
does not adequately speak to why this occurs. 
Part of the problem is rhetorical, in the popular sense of that 
term. Professors Spaeth and Segal suggest a matter of honor with 
 
 36. Although I am always happy to talk about justice, especially outside of a courtroom, I 
am not so sure that the dismal science is yet capable of measuring it. Natural science is value 
neutral; the facts are what they are, and a hypothesis either better explains the phenomena than 
the previous one or not. Law and economics appears to have some values, although they are not 
necessarily universally shared. One of its founders, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., whom 
acclaimed historian Jacque Barzun described as the lesser Holmes, was famously without values, 
other than perhaps “might makes right.” Efficiency and cost-benefit analysis are notoriously 
viewed from the eyes of the beholder. Recall Justice Holmes’s dissent in Lochner v. New York, 
198 U.S. 45 (1905): he thought that the Fourteenth Amendment did not enact Herbert Spencer, 
but Holmes himself was privately a fan! See id. at 75–76. The late Bernard Schwartz, criticizing a 
Judge Posner opinion that he believed minimized the value of procedural rights, noted that cost-
benefit analysis can create Oscar Wilde’s cynic: a person “who knows the price of everything 
and the value of nothing.” See Bernard Schwarz, Recent Administrative Law Issues and Trends, 
3 ADMIN. L.J. 543, 559 n.14 (1990). It rarely is efficient to grant a defendant procedural rights. 
In a bit of a paradigm shift, there has been some interesting use of law and economics 
public choice theory techniques to take sides in value allocation. Professor Jonathan Macey has 
advocated that public interest statutes ought to be liberally interpreted by reference to their 
announced purposes, and that by doing this judges would raise the costs of rent-seeking 
(through which small but powerful groups obtain legislative benefits at the expense of the 
citizenry at large) and would contribute to the public welfare. See Jonathan R. Macey, 
Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group 
Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 261–66 (1986). Likewise, Professor William Eskridge has 
suggested legislative interpretive strategies for the appropriate treatment of statutes. See 
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 813 (4th ed. 
2007). Judge Frank Easterbrook mentioned a similar approach in his Harvard Law Review 
Foreword on the Supreme Court’s 1983 Term. See Frank Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1987 
Term—Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1984). 
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their discussion on the antepenultimate page of their famed study. 
Arguing that substantive due process alone disproves that the Court 
has major constraints operating upon it (and referencing celebrated 
cases such as Lochner v. New York,37 Roe v. Wade,38 Griswold v. 
Connecticut,39 Flood v. Kuhn,40 and the notoriously illogic and evil 
consideration of a tomato as a fruit), they note that “It is precisely 
because the justices exercise virtually untrammeled discretion—and 
do so, moreover, authoritatively—that enables them to blink at 
reality and incorporate illogic and falsehood into the law of the 
land.”41 I submit that the number of Justices—or judges—who intend 
to or think that they incorporate illogic and falsehood into the law is 
virtually nonexistent. Further, I think that the number who actually 
do so is statistically insignificant. “Per leggem terrae,” the Latin 
phrase for “law of the land” that over centuries has become the 
American concept of due process of law, has evolved. And by and 
large, it has been the near consensus (less so of late, but still a near 
consensus) that the Constitution must be flexible in the joints (Justice 
Holmes), that it should not be read as a tax statute (Justice 
Frankfurter), and that we might have living traditions (Justice 
Harlan).42 One should keep in mind that Frankfurter and Harlan were 
the paradigmatic conservatives of the Warren Court, and Justice 
Holmes was, well, the Judge Posner of his time. 
I suppose that Professors Segal and Spaeth think that these 
various interpretations of due process, or extensions of due process, 
are false—but law, like economics, does not often think profitably in 
terms of true and false. A tomato by any other name is either a fruit 
or a vegetable; I suspect that a lot of “vegetables” are botanically 
fruits, and I have never termed anyone evil who was unclear or 
inclusive on the point. I grow “fruits” in my “vegetable garden,” 
never realizing the error of my ways. And, although judicial 
consciences have become a bit numb and are not what they used to 
be, I think we ought to do something in the rare cases in which they 
get “shocked.” The authors may be responding to criticism of their 
model, but they seem to be inordinately defensive. 
 
 37. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 38. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 39. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 40. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). 
 41. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL 361 (1993). 
 42. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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That is not to say that judges have not fired back a bit 
rhetorically (again, in the popular meaning of the term). Professor 
Ramseyer quotes Judge Harry Edwards, who has been known to send 
salvos to the academy, as commenting on the “heedless observations 
of academic scholars who misconstrue and misunderstand the work 
of . . . judges.” Judge Edwards called it “absurd” and “sheer 
speculation” to term dissenting judges “whistle-blowers.”43 Ramseyer, 
in an earlier draft, goes on to accuse Judge Edwards of missing the 
point: 
If Edwards thinks attempts to predict judicial votes through political 
variables demeaning, he misses the way they capture the 
fundamental independence of the federal courts. Were courts not 
independent, judges could not costlessly indulge their political 
biases. And if they could not indulge them at low cost, they would 
not indulge them often. That they act politically in political cases 
simply reflects their essential independence. That politics matters 
should not embarrass. To the extent judicial independence is a good, 
it should engender pride.44 
I must say that I do not think that Judge Edwards has missed the 
point. He is not known for such oversights. His point is that, if 
scholars espouse the view that law is only a reductionist, mechanistic 
model of individual preferences, the very independence that we 
judges have would be under attack and respect for decisions would be 
diminished.45 
To take a tough example, it was not correct to think that 
Democrats would vote for Al Gore and Republicans would vote for 
George Bush in Bush v. Gore,46 disappointing as that decision was to 
many who neutrally felt that the Court should restrain from Justice 
Frankfurter’s political thicket—especially because the partisan 
Florida legislature or the partisan House of Representatives would 
have reached the very same result. One should recall that two 
 
 43. Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 1558 (quoting Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision 
Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1335, 1337 (1998)). 
 44. Ramseyer, supra note 34 (manuscript at 2–3). 
 45. However, lest we judges be unfairly criticized as hostile to the whole endeavor, let me 
remind you that the federal courts are moving to electronic case filing which results in 
remarkable openness and transparency with respect to judicial outcomes and statistics. Indeed, 
given this easily available information, the economical scholars may figure out a way to create 
virtual federal courts and even market these as a cheaper alternative. See Lynn M. Lopucki, 
Court-System Transparency, 92 IOWA L. REV. 482 (2009). 
 46. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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Republican-appointed Justices did not vote with the majority.47 
Perhaps some other models could explain the decision—maybe even 
a simple “liberal versus conservative” model—but again, judges are 
skeptical that simple models explain enough cases to be accurate. The 
citizenry may think something else is going on, too. The judicial 
branch always outscores the other two branches in public opinion 
polls (although it was tied with President Bush at the height of his 
popularity), and polls showed that public support of the Supreme 
Court did not diminish after Bush v. Gore. Maybe the citizens were 
ready for some other news; maybe mysticism—the Court as oracle—
still works. As the late Pope John Paul II lamented, “Unfortunately, 
there is no lack of young people and adults who search for signs of 
their destiny in the stars.”48 
II.  ARE THE MODELS ACCURATE? 
The first substantive reason that “offense” may be taken is that 
judges do not think that most models are accurate. That is for several 
reasons. First, as Judge Posner has noted, the models only operate in 
the “open area—the area in which a judge is a legislator.”49 The large 
majority of cases decided by appellate judges on the courts of appeal 
are decided unanimously.50 There is a certain legalism—there are 
certain rules that clearly apply to a large majority of cases, and 
political ideology or philosophy has nothing to do with those 
decisions. Likewise, the majority of trial court decisions are very 
similar in result. Even after the Sentencing Guidelines have become 
advisory, there is still great consensus on sentence ranges. 
Some empirical scholars note this point, but they rarely 
emphasize it because they do not find it interesting. But it is 
important not to understate reality; rules, standards of review, and 
precedents do a lot of heavy lifting. There is usually no Democratic or 
Republican response to armed bank robbery; nor is there a 
pragmatist, civic republican, or dreaded judicial cosmopolitan view of 
 
 47. See id. at 123 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 129 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 48. Helen Kennedy, Pope Tells Followers Don’t Wish on Stars, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 20, 
1996, at 6. 
 49. POSNER, supra note 10, at 15. 
 50. Interestingly, I recently heard Justice Ginsburg point out to a group of students that 
about 30 percent of the cases heard by the Supreme Court are unanimous—even though the 
Supreme Court takes cases that are often controversial and have split the circuits. That all nine 
Justices, some of widely divergent views, agree on potentially divisive cases suggests concepts of 
law at work. 
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the offense (although Europeans, well, I guess almost everyone, 
incarcerates for shorter periods than we do). Almost everyone 
opposes armed bank robbery, and rather predictable legalistic results 
occur if one commits this offense. The phenomena of judicial 
decisionmaking cannot be explained by ignoring the fact that there 
are many legal rules that judges consistently follow in the great 
majority of cases. Further, judges’ decisions in controversial cases 
often move into a great body of precedent and cease to be 
controversial. In law, it is often sufficient to know what the rule is, 
rather than whether the rule makes sense. Thus, baseball is not 
subject to antitrust laws like other big sports—but baseball is off-base, 
and this rule is now predictable, okay, and not worth the effort of 
overturning that nifty Blackmun opinion that literarily explains the 
legal differences.51 
Further, judges believe that the initial models were often 
themselves inaccurate, even in the open areas. The first studies 
seemed to argue that judicial decisions could be largely predicted by 
simple party identification. This argument can quickly become 
problematic. A few Justices who did not hew to the appointer’s line 
come to mind: Earl Warren, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, 
David Souter, and of course, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 
Even as the methodologies have become more nuanced, other 
problems have surfaced. Although Professors Choi and Gulati 
advanced the ball with their tripartite index using productivity 
(number of published opinions), quality (relative number of 
citations), and independence (frequency with which judges disagreed 
with appointees from the same political party),52 each of these 
categories poses certain problems. 
With regard to measuring productivity as a function of published 
opinions, some judges take a completely different approach. Partly 
for reasons of judicial modesty (I think) but mostly because I 
sympathize with lawyers, I do not publish cases that add nothing to 
the corpus of the law. Some circuits render very summary 
affirmations that are only a couple of paragraphs and are not usually 
“published.” (Of course, everything is actually published these days, 
and is accessible, though not in an official reporter.) We do not use 
these summary affirmations in the Tenth Circuit; even though many 
 
 51. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). 
 52. See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An 
Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23, 40–68 (2004). 
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of our decisions do not establish binding precedent, they do, as a rule, 
thoroughly explain the action taken. But, if the case does not add to 
the law, or refine a concept, I usually do not publish it. These cases 
are at best merely persuasive, and should not be cited as a rule. But 
they are real opinions, though, and some of them may take quite a bit 
of work (for example, multiple claims by an inmate against a prison 
come to mind). Indeed, my first case taken by the Supreme Court was 
an unpublished opinion.53 I had merely cited and followed our 
dispositive circuit precedent (with which I personally disagreed, 
preferring Chevron deference to the administering agency) and 
followed it. The Court evidently wanted the fact pattern of my case, 
and took it with several others to resolve circuit differences on a point 
of law. 
So if the mere number of opinions is to be a factor in judicial 
evaluations, I suppose I need to publish more. I hate that more trees 
must die for me to be “productive.” I would prefer to evaluate 
opinions in a way that is not based on raw numbers of one class of 
cases. Although the number of opinions one writes may reflect a 
certain efficiency, it may also simply reflect the court’s caseload. 
Likewise, with regard to citation of judicial opinions by other 
judges, problems may exist. Although this measure is often suggestive 
of a certain quality, it may not be the reality. For example, Professors 
Cross and Lindquist suggest in their article that “nimbleness” of pen 
may result in more citations than the logic or clarity of the opinion.54 
The ability to turn a Handian or Holmesian phrase may lend to 
citation, as might wit or polymathic magniloquence. Also, writing an 
opinion notorious for being “wrong” might also lead to many cites. It 
is interesting to note that Professors Cross and Lindquist, unlike 
Professors Choi and Gulati, conclude in their study that the judges 
who scored best “for outside circuit citations did not tend to have 
greater success when the Supreme Court reviewed their decisions.”55 
Finally, independence is indeed a value (although potentially a 
costly one, as I will discuss in the next paragraph), but I am not sure 
that disagreeing with appointees of one’s own party defines it. 
Perhaps the quality of a dissent or concurrence might be relevant to 
independence. Towing the legal line in a controversial case might be 
 
 53. See Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., No. 96-3380, 1998 WL 105933 (10th Cir. Mar. 11, 
1998), aff’d, 527 U.S. 516 (1999). 
 54. Cross & Lindquist, supra note 21, at 1417 n.127. 
 55. Id. at 1386. 
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relevant, as well. It is widely thought (though questioned by some 
scholars of late) that certain federal judges who courageously 
enforced civil rights legislation in the South were engaging in 
behavior that should be encouraged. (I’m with the wide thinkers.) 
Even life tenure judges face problems in controversial cases. Being 
attacked by or in the press without the ability to respond is painful; 
scorn, reproach, contempt, and ridicule hurt despite the security of 
life tenure, creating pain for a judge’s family and friends. Judges can 
demonstrate courage and independence in many ways and 
disagreeing with judges from one’s own party is just one of these 
ways. 
Another problem with the accuracy of the studies is that the 
titles often overstate their arguments—a trait particularly annoying to 
judges who frequently see attorneys do the same. A 2008 study is 
entitled The Myth of the Generalist Judge.56 But the study does not 
disprove the existence of generalist judges at all; it merely shows that 
there is a relatively small bit of specializing going on.57 Another study, 
entitled Mr. Justice Posner? Unpacking the Statistics, posits that the 
winner of a tournament of judges would likely be Justice Posner.58 But 
that is highly unlikely for several reasons, some of which are 
completely missed by the model. The model does not consider age 
(Judge Posner is over 70, and although one would expect him to be in 
league with his hero Justice Holmes in this regard, the likelihood of a 
person of his age being appointed to the Court is slim); nor does it 
consider the appointer’s political party (although President Obama 
and Judge Posner share a love of the Windy City, it is unlikely that a 
moderate-to-liberal Democrat would appoint a “conservative” 
Republican to the Court, even though Judge Posner was a registered 
Democrat when President Reagan appointed him). Further, although 
the model gives points for something elusively defined as 
“independence,”59 it is independence (or perhaps academic 
independence) that can keep a person from getting on the Court—
perhaps analogous to Judge Posner’s explanation of why Judge Bork 
did not make the cut.60 Some of Judge Posner’s earlier academic 
 
 56. Edward K. Cheng, The Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519 (2008). 
 57. See id. at 533–44. 
 58. See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Mr. Justice Posner? Unpacking the Statistics, 61 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 19, 42 (2005). 
 59. Id. at 38–42. 
 60. See RICHARD POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 237–55 (1995). Judge Posner lists some of 
Judge Bork’s controversial views, pointing out that his failure to be confirmed was not due to 
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writings may be the reason why he is not on the Court now. Judge 
Posner’s writing style is very clear, informal, and too frank and 
controversial for squeamish politicians—that may be why his opinions 
are fun to read. Finally, one must speculate that an individual like 
Judge Posner would be bored with the relatively simple task of 
producing one-ninth of less than a hundred opinions.61 
This does not mean that prediction cannot be improved. It does, 
however, caution against overstating titles, and overstating the 
models. A recent study did purport to predict Supreme Court 
decisions more accurately than a panel of experts, and that suggests 
that some real progress is being made.62 But some other values—like 
following precedent and complying with standards of review—ought 
to be considered, whereas some values—like craft—may be very 
difficult to quantify for mathematical study. 
III.  ARE THE STUDIES RELEVANT? 
Another problem that some judges have with the studies relates 
to accuracy. If the studies are envisioned to do something other than 
predict, such as evaluate, then judges have real concerns. First, as 
Professor Larry Solum has written, a core of judicial values is not 
included in the studies. As noted early, although Professors Choi and 
Gulati advanced the ball with their tripartite index, the more or less 
Aristotelian virtues that Professor Solum has mentioned are not 
considered. These virtues include his “thin” virtues of incorruptibility, 
courage, temperament and impartiality, diligence and carefulness, 
intelligence, and craft; and his “thick” virtues of justice (dare we say 
 
the power of the intellectual class or the “knowledge class,” as Bork termed his adversaries. 
Rather, Posner concludes that a large number of Americans simply disagreed with Bork’s stated 
views and controversial terminology. He notes, for example, that Americans do not want states 
to enforce racial restrictive covenants; they do not think the federal government should racially 
discriminate; and they do not believe that under Chief Justice Rehnquist and his predecessors, 
“the political seduction of the law continues apace”—all positions Bork had taken at various 
times. Further, Americans do not like the results that Bork would be likely to reach based on his 
writings. Id. at 254–55. Posner is neutral on this phenomenon: “In a representative democracy, 
the fact that many (it need not be most) people do not like the probable consequences of a 
judge’s judicial philosophy provides permissible, and in any event inevitable, grounds for the 
people’s representatives to refuse to consent to his appointment, even if popular antipathy to 
the judge is not grounded in a well-thought-out theory of adjudication.” Id. at 255. 
 61. See Christopher Shea, Posner Writes Faster than Publishers Can Publish, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Feb. 24, 2009, http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/brainiac/2009/02/posner_writes 
_f.html. 
 62. See POSNER, supra note 10, at 24 n.12. 
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it?) and practical wisdom.63 Admittedly, some of these virtues are 
difficult to quantify. But the ABA takes great care in rating judges for 
temperament, and it is widely believed that the ABA has prevented a 
few disasters over the years.64 
To be sure, it might be hard to fit these kinds of virtues into any 
metric. But these words regularly appear in the Almanac on the 
Judiciary, an admittedly anecdotal but frequently consulted 
evaluation of judges from the lawyers who practice before them. 
Justice Frankfurter was once asked if making a person a judge made 
them a better person. He replied that this would be true only if the 
person were a good person to begin with.65 Giving a jerk the ermine is 
not likely to cause him or her to change ways. 
Another virtue ignored by the studies but valued by most judges 
is the elusive concept of collegiality. Some judges are peacemakers, 
and they are to be blessed. They promote civility and prevent courts 
from becoming scorpions in a bottle. Likewise, fairness and openness 
to other views are valued. It is difficult to know how these virtues 
affect prediction of judicial outcomes, and it is likewise difficult to 
evaluate whether they suggest that a judge should be retained or 
reelected. Yet these judges are esteemed and valued highly by their 
colleagues: Judge Frank Coffin and Judge Arnold come to mind. 
Known and esteemed by virtually all of their colleagues, they add 
much to the judicial enterprise both from within and without. 
Finally, other judicial functions are not addressed by most of the 
studies. If we are evaluating judges to take some kind of action (and 
given the hard-fought independence of federal judges, taking action 
other than in the rare cases in which judges seek promotion is 
unlikely), it is necessary to get everything in the mix. Chief judges 
often have a large amount of administrative work. Some judges, 
typically among the best, have committee service both within their 
judicial districts and nationwide. They may serve on committees that 
draft proposed jury instructions, or on judicial councils that handle 
administrative affairs and the relatively rare but vitally important 
matters of judicial misconduct. Attorney discipline and misconduct 
also demand time. 
 
 63. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 
475, 498–522 (2005). 
 64. I can’t say everything I know here. 
 65. Felix Frankfurter, Chief Justices I Have Known, 39 VA. L. REV. 883, 901 (1953). 
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IV.  ARE THE STUDIES HELPFUL? 
I have discussed the possibility that these studies have limited 
use. Appointers, like presidents and governors, may have their own 
criteria and many may simply feel that things are going well the way 
they are. Further, restraint is “in” again, and there is much to say for 
the conventional wisdom of “if it ain’t broke don’t fix it.” 
One of the seemingly obvious factors that could be evaluated is 
the time it takes a judge to render an opinion. With all the economists 
studying these things, I am surprised that I have not read more about 
this. I am surprised, but not necessarily disappointed. 
Justice delayed can be justice denied, but as one of my colleagues 
once said in a debate, “justice rushed is justice flushed.” From my 
discussions with colleagues and my experiences on both sides of the 
bench, I have learned about two kinds of efficiency issues. First, there 
are indeed judges who are very slow. This can be terribly unjust to 
litigants, delaying recompense for damages, often thereby enhancing 
those damages, and in perhaps the worst of situations, resulting in 
incarceration when a litigant should be released. But judges have 
ways of working on this. One of the duties of chief judges is to 
monitor delay, and they try to do so and use the tools that they have 
to address the issues. But delay comes from different sources. In some 
cases, the judge may be new; the case may be hard; or the authoring 
judge may await a dissent, concurrence, or even a vote for weeks or 
months. A judge may become ill or have a life crisis that requires a bit 
of delay. This is not to say that judicial evaluations should not 
consider inordinate delay, but that the consideration must be 
nuanced. 
The second problem I have sometimes seen is excessive speed. 
Some judges are dismissive of others’ views, simply firing off a quick 
opinion without considering other judges’ perspectives. I remember 
an old Scottish prayer that decorated the office of a Benedictine 
monk who was president of a local college: “Grant O Lord that we 
might always be right, for Thou knowest we will never change our 
minds.” I think it is unfortunate when judges advance speed over 
collegial consideration and openness to other views. And I am 
uncomfortable with evaluations that encourage speed by promoting a 
tournament of speedy judging. Timed chess is interesting to watch, 
but it does not really reveal who the ideal player is. 
And that is the final point. We judges believe that judicial 
independence is good, and we believe that litigants believe and 
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recognize that it is good. We are reluctant to have evaluations that we 
fear are inaccurate introduced into the mix. 
Of course, these evaluations will continue. I hope that they 
become further refined, that they better explain judicial outcomes, 
and that the knowledge will translate to virtue. Judge Posner states 
that he wants to “part the curtains a bit.”66 I think parting the curtains 
a bit is good, but I am for not drawing them completely. 
Alexis de Toqueville was right that there is a sense of American 
exceptionalism,67 and that the judicial branch encompasses much of 
that exceptionalism. I also agree with Harold Koh that there is good 
exceptionalism and bad exceptionalism,68 but I think that our judicial 
system is by and large in the former category. Our legal rules and 
legal culture have devised a system that validly restrains judges, and 
has developed a certain sense of confidence, though it also uses a bit 
of curtain. 
Before I walked into the ceremonial courtroom to take my public 
oath of office when I became a judge, I scratched out a brief outline 
of some remarks that I would say. It was a rhetorical moment, so I 
hope to be forgiven a certain epideictic character. I quoted Judge 
Coffin’s view that appellate courts exist to correct mistakes, but not 
all of them. I mused at the excitement of how panels of judges “of 
diverse legal backgrounds and experiences, with talented staffs and 
clerks and assistants, can view the law from different perspectives, 
within the common framework, however, of the law itself, which is 
never static.” Having mentioned the restraint on judges provided by 
the Constitution’s clear text and masterful generalities, I closed with 
these words, which, I confess, I still believe: 
Judges are restrained by the legal system in America, by our 
common law school education, by the Bar, by our friends and 
especially those friends of ours who are judges at the trial level 
whom we know and respect. Judges are restrained by the law and 
tradition, as well they should be. But judges, like legislators, 
executives and citizens, all share a responsibility to keep the courts 
open so that the aggrieved, whether multi-national corporations or 
 
 66. POSNER, supra note 10, at 2. 
 67. See SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET & GARY MARKS, IT DIDN’T HAPPEN HERE: WHY 
SOCIALISM FAILED IN THE UNITED STATES 15 (2000). 
 68. See Harold Hongju Koh, Foreword: On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
1479, 1480–87 (2003). 
HENRY IN FINAL.DOC 5/5/2009  4:22:28 PM 
2009] DO JUDGES THINK? 1723 
pro se prisoners, can have their day in court. I know I am inadequate 
to this task, but not surprisingly, I accept the appointment. 
Judges are people too. They try to maximize what they want to 
maximize. But they do think, and they are restrained in a pragmatic 
sort of way by the factors I have mentioned. I am grateful that the 
Duke Law Journal made this Symposium possible because it provided 
a rare opportunity for discussion between bench and academy. I wish 
the academy well in its continued search to predict and evaluate 
judges. I will watch its work, and try to do better in mine. 
